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1. INTRODUCTION 
The banking industry has experienced a tremendously geographic expansion in recent 
decades. Despite some studies linking geographical diversification with financial 
performance of banks, no consensus has been reached so far. Some argue that diversified 
banks can benefit from the economies of scope (e.g., Deng and Elyasiani, 2008) and the 
coinsurance effect (e.g., Akhigbe and Whyte, 2003). On the other hand, some suggest that 
diversified banks suffer from value decrease due to the lack of managerial skills (e.g., Klein 
and Saidenberg, 1998), more complex organizational structure (e.g., Berger and De Young, 
2006), and more intensive competition (e.g., Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).1 
 
China offers an ideal setting to study the relation between geographical diversification and 
bank performance for the following reasons: First, in the presence of underdeveloped capital 
markets, Chinese banks have been playing a crucial role in channeling financial resources 
towards firms with financing needs (Allen et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2010). According to 
The Banker, an influential financial publication, China has the largest bank market since 
2013, contributing to more than 30% of the profit of the global banking industry. Second, 
Chinese banking industry is highly regulated. Most commercial banks, except for the 
Big-Five,2 faced strict restrictions on geographical expansion. However, in 2009, China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the leading regulatory body of Chinese banking 
industry, announced a policy that aimed at relaxing the geographical branching restrictions 
                                                             
1 Our paper also adds to the existing literature on bank branching, e.g., Cohen and Mazzeo (2010) and Deller and 
Sundaram-Stukel (2012). 
2 They include: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, 
Bank of China and Bank of Communications.  
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(Circular No. 143 of CBRC). Specifically, the joint-stock and city commercial banks are 
allowed to operate in other cities, particularly for those with prior experiences in 
cross-region operation. In addition, the requirements on working capital are also abolished, 
lowering the entry threshold of small and medium-sized banks. Consequently, the level of 
geographical expansion of Chinese banks has been considerably influenced by the 
deregulation policy. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To begin with, we perform an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Nevertheless, 
identifying the causal effect of geographical diversification on bank performance poses 
challenges because banks may select the level of diversification based on unobserved 
characteristics, which could bias the OLS estimates in a way that is hard to predict. To 
mitigate the concern, we also employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, using the 
bank deregulation policy to instrument for the level of diversification. In the first stage, we 
examine the following equation: 
, 0 1 , , ,i t t i t i t c i t i tbranch policy policy characteristics control              (1) 
where Branchi,t is the number of cities in which bank i operates in year t (excluding the city 
where it is headquartered). Policy is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the years after 2009, 
and otherwise 0. Policy*characteristics are the interaction terms of the Policy dummy 
variable and bank characteristics. Based on the Circular No.143, we focus on three 
characteristics: (1) J&C, a dummy variable that equals 1 for a joint-stock bank or a city 
commercial bank, and otherwise 0. These two types of banks are especially encouraged to 
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expand their branches; (2) Experience, measured as the number of cities in which bank i 
operated (except the headquarter city) prior to 2009, because banks with previous 
experiences in cross-region operation are prioritized to expand; (3) CAR is measured as the 
capital adequacy ratio prior to 2009, as the Circular No.143 abolishes using capital adequacy 
ratio as a requirement for expansion. We also control for other factors that may affect 
geographical diversification: Loanratio (total loan/total asset), Size (the natural logarithm of 
total assets), ROA (net income/total assets), and Age (the number of year since the bank’s 
inception). 
 
In the second stage, we test the following equation: 
, 0 1 , , ,i t i t c i t i tperformance branch control                    (2) 
where Performancei,t is measured as follows: the market share (MS, bank i's share in total 
deposits in year t), the net interest margin (NIM, net interest income scaled by total deposits), 
the cost-to-income ratio (COST, operating costs scaled by total assets), the net income to 
total assets ratio (ROA), and the non-interest income share (NII, non-interest income scaled 
by total income). In addition to the control variables used in Eq. (1), we also control for 
Growth (the growth rate of asset) and DEPO (the deposit-to-asset ratio), which may also 
affect bank performance.  
 
Our main data source is BankScope database, supplemented by geographical diversification 
data that is manually collected from the websites and annual reports of the banks. Our 
sample covers the period 2006-2012. We exclude Big-Five banks because they had branches 
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in every city even before the deregulation. Finally, we obtain 568 bank-year observations. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max 
MS 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.032 
NIM 0.063 0.053 0.010 0.056 0.551 
COST 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.020 
ROA 1.240 0.450 -0.100 1.220 2.670 
NII 0.050 0.040 0.000 0.040 0.220 
Branch 6.770 14.640 0.000 1.000 110.000 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Table 2 presents the results of Tobit regression examining the determinants of geographical 
expansion. As reported in column (1), the coefficient on Policy is significantly positive, 
suggesting that banks’ geographical diversification increased significantly following the 
deregulation policy. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on J&C*Policy is significantly 
positive, indicating that joint-stock or city commercial banks experienced more geographical 
expansions after deregulation. Column (3) shows that Experience*Policy also has a 
significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that banks with prior experiences in 
geographical expansion tend to open more branches following deregulation. Column (4) 
shows that the coefficient on CAR * Policy is significantly negative, implying that the 
importance of capital adequacy ratio in geographical expansion is weakened after 
deregulation. 
Table 2: The Determinants of Geographical Expansion 
 Branch 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
J&C 9.708** 5.371** 2.346*** 3.283*** 
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 (2.222) (2.019) (9.781) (7.230) 
Policy 1.326*** -3.782*** -1.238*** 0.528 
 (2.780) (-4.855) (-9.792) (0.649) 
J&C * Policy  6.033*** 2.576** 2.213*** 
  (2.991) (2.426) (4.904) 
Experience   0.960*** 0.958*** 
   (8.222) (18.392) 
Experience * Policy   0.475*** 0.466*** 
   (13.079) (14.302) 
CAR    33.418 
    (1.566) 
CAR * Policy    -13.391** 
    (-2.421) 
Loanratio 29.502** 30.222** 5.851 7.023 
 (2.074) (2.041) (1.340) (1.251) 
Size 10.562*** 10.567*** 2.617** 2.867*** 
 (12.893) (13.767) (2.093) (5.561) 
ROA -1.395 -1.495 -1.089 -0.663 
 (-0.454) (-0.466) (-0.674) (-0.829) 
Age 1.779*** 2.066*** 0.494* 1.045 
 (5.368) (3.153) (1.661) (1.385) 
Observations 568 568 568 568 
Pseudo R2 0.1738 0.1749 0.2886 0.2968 
Constants not reported. The numbers reported in the parentheses are robust standard errors that are 
clustered by banks. Tobit regressions are employed because the dependent variable branch is 
a censored data. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 presents the regression results regarding the impact of geographical diversification 
on bank performance. As aforementioned, we use five measures to proxy for bank 
performance. Columns (1) and (2) present the results using market share as the performance 
measure. The OLS results show that the coefficient on Branch is positive and significant at 
the 1% level, consistent with geographical expansion increasing market share. The economic 
significance is also sizable: if the bank establishes 10 more branches, its market share will 
increase by 0.28%. The results remain unaffected using 2SLS estimation. Similarly, the 
results reported in columns (3) and (4) suggest that banks gain higher net interest margins 
after expansion. Overall, our results are consistent with branch banking stabilizing banking 
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systems by increasing diversification opportunities.   
 
However, the results reported in columns (5) and (6) show a negative side of geographical 
expansion: banks bear higher operating costs as the level of diversification increases. These 
results suggest a potential tradeoff between economic gains (market shares or interest 
margins) and operating costs due to banks’ expansion. Moreover, geographical 
diversification has a positive but insignificant impact on ROA as shown in columns (7) and 
(8), whereas it increases non-interest income as seen in columns (9) and (10). The 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics suggest that our study is relatively free of the weak 
instruments problem. 
 
One potential drawback of the independent variable, Branch, is that it does not well capture 
the geographical footprint of banks’ expansion. Thus, we use an alternative proxy for 
diversification that is measured based on the surface areas spanned by branches: the average 
distance between the city where the bank is headquartered and each prefecture in which the 
bank sets up at least one branch. Our results remain robust to this alternative measure.3 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This study finds that geographical expansion of banks increases market share, net interest 
margin and non-interest income, but it is also associated with rising operating costs. Overall, 
our results suggest both bright and dark sides of geographical expansion of Chinese banks. 
                                                             
3 We appreciate the reviewer for suggesting this test. To preserve space, the results are not tabulated but 
available upon request.  
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Table 3: Geographical Diversification and Bank Performance 
 MS NIM COST ROA NII 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Branch 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.072*** 0.065* 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005 0.006 0.107*** 0.102*** 
 (9.829) (4.222) (3.019) (1.934) (3.850) (2.775) (1.428) (1.297) (5.727) (3.871) 
Loanratio 0.599*** 0.728*** -24.296*** -21.287*** 0.561** 0.672** 0.003 -0.076 -3.364* -3.514* 
 (2.728) (2.789) (-3.264) (-2.919) (2.268) (2.540) (0.006) (-0.120) (-1.963) (-1.933) 
Size 0.124*** 0.173*** -1.453*** -1.317*** -0.114*** -0.102*** -0.170*** -0.169*** 0.965*** 0.993*** 
 (3.495) (3.404) (-3.879) (-2.989) (-3.611) (-3.087) (-3.111) (-2.868) (5.547) (3.933) 
Age -0.044 -0.043 -0.536 -0.578 -0.036 -0.033 -0.105 -0.112 0.736*** 0.744*** 
 (-1.407) (-1.258) (-1.314) (-1.491) (-0.809) (-0.745) (-1.170) (-1.253) (2.992) (3.045) 
Growth -0.028 -0.012 -2.246* -1.829 0.015 0.024 -0.124 -0.123 0.679 0.652 
 (-0.598) (-0.224) (-1.848) (-1.490) (0.238) (0.376) (-0.534) (-0.527) (1.187) (1.119) 
DEPO -0.005 -0.002 -7.003* -6.930* 0.429* 0.372 -0.533 -0.422 -2.905** -2.957** 
 (-0.045) (-0.013) (-1.757) (-1.704) (1.761) (1.579) (-1.082) (-0.870) (-2.083) (-2.102) 
CAR -0.578** -0.608** -16.159** -13.680* 0.516 0.472 -1.037 -0.910 7.002 6.678 
 (-2.276) (-2.140) (-2.096) (-1.756) (1.043) (0.960) (-0.761) (-0.675) (1.458) (1.383) 
N 470 470 470 470 455 455 470 470 470 470 
R2 0.800 0.792 0.363 0.344 0.184 0.189 0.102 0.097 0.587 0.587 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 121.30    121.296  25.680      121.296  19.452  
5% maximal IV relative bias 13.91  13.91  13.91  13.91  13.91 
10% maximal IV relative bias 9.08  9.08  9.08  9.08  9.08 
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